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INTRODUCTION
States increasingly are raising financing indirectly through
special-purpose entities (SPEs), variously referred to as author1
ities, special authorities, or public authorities. Some states,
such as New York, New Jersey, and Virginia, issue relatively
2
few general obligation bonds, obtaining most of their financing
through bonds issued by state SPEs:
[A] state such as New York, for example, with one of the highest percapita debt burdens in the nation, owes only $3.5 billion in “general
obligation” debt. New York owes the remainder of its $78.4 billion in
debt through hundreds of special “authorities,” including the Transitional Finance Authority, Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the
3
Dormitory Authority, and others.

Virtually all states obtain at least a portion of their public fi4
nancing through state SPEs.

1. See, e.g., Lynn Wilson & Clayton Eichelberger, New York State Public
Authority Reform: Where We Have Come from and Where We Need to Go,
GOV’T L. & POL’Y J., Fall 2009, at 15, 15. Perhaps the nation’s most wellknown example of a state SPE is the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, whose operations include the tunnels and bridges between New York
and New Jersey, the PATH rail system, and the JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark
airports. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
2. These are the traditional debt securities issued by states, payment of
which is backed directly by a state’s full faith and credit and taxing power.
General Obligation Bond (G.O. Bond), MUN. SECS. RULEMAKING BOARD,
http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/glossary/view_def.asp?param=
GENERALOBLIGATIONBOND (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
3. Nicole Gelinas, “State and Municipal Debt: The Coming Crisis?”, PUB.
SECTOR INC. (Feb. 7, 2011, 8:43 AM), http://www.publicsectorinc.com/psi_
articles/2011/02/state-and-municipal-debt-the-coming-crisis.html;
see also
CLAIRE G. COHEN, FITCH RATINGS, STATE DEBT AND EXPOSURE TO DEBT-LIKE
COMMITMENTS 2 (2006) (observing that “New York, New Jersey, and Virginia
finance almost exclusively through authorities”).
4. Rhonda Riherd Trautman, The Impact of State Debt Management on
Debt Activity, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Summer 1995, at 33, 35 tbl.1, 38 tbl.2;
see also JERRY MITCHELL, THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT WITH GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS 15 (1999) (“At the subnational level, government corporations
can be found in every state and most localities.”); Gail Radford, From Municipal Socialism to Public Authorities: Institutional Factors in the Shaping of
American Public Enterprise, 90 J. AM. HIST. 863, 867 (2003) (“All Americans
now live within overlapping layers of quasi-governmental units responsible for
public services . . . .”).
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Notwithstanding their long history and increasingly wide5
spread use, relatively little is known about state SPEs. Origi6
nally modeled on the Port Authority of London, state SPEs
were first used in the United States in the late nineteenth cen7
tury. They initially were seen as a way to bypass various restrictions that hampered traditional government agencies, no8
tably constitutional debt limits and jurisdictional limitations.
In recent years, however, the use of state SPEs increasingly
has been paralleling the use of special-purpose entities in corporate finance (hereinafter, corporate SPEs) as a means of rais9
ing “off-balance-sheet” financing. This is a financing in which

5. Jonathan Rosenbloom, Can a Private Corporate Analysis of Public Authority Administration Lead to Democracy?, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 851, 870
(2005–2006) (“Despite an increase in the number of public authorities, the services they render and the debt they issue, public authorities remain a fairly
unstudied matter.”). The scholarship on state SPEs is not only sparse but also
decades old. See, e.g., William T. R. Fox & Annette Baker Fox, Municipal Government and Special-Purpose Authorities, 207 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 176 (1940); Peter R. Nehemkis, Jr., The Public Authority: Some Legal and
Practical Aspects, 47 YALE L.J. 14 (1937); Jerome Shestack, The Public Authority, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1957).
6. Nehemkis, supra note 5, at 14 n.2.
7. Shestack, supra note 5, at 556.
8. See Fox & Fox, supra note 5, at 178 (explaining that it was much easier to create an SPE than to remove a constitutional debt limit, and noting that
SPEs were in part created to solve jurisdictional issues that arose because “political boundaries . . . never coincide with social and economic boundaries”); see
also GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (GASB), STATEMENT NO.
14: THE FINANCIAL REPORTING ENTITY ¶¶ 5–7 (1991) (noting that separate
organizations are sometimes created to overcome state constitutional, statutory, or charter obstacles or to provide a level of autonomy not permitted by the
“general government’s organizational framework”). These paragraphs are not
impacted by GASB Statement No. 61’s amendments to Statement No. 14. For
a comparison of the amendments to the original text, see GASB, EXPOSURE
DRAFT, THE FINANCIAL REPORTING ENTITY: AN AMENDMENT OF GASB
STATEMENTS NO. 14 AND NO. 34 ¶¶ 24–53 (2010).
9. For an introduction to corporate SPEs, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron
and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70
U. CIN. L. REV. 1309 (2002) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Special Purpose Entities in
Corporate Structures]. Corporate finance that involves the use of corporate
SPEs is often referred to as structured finance. See id. at 1314. Structured finance in which corporate SPEs issue securities to investors and use the proceeds to purchase financial assets, collections on which are used to repay the
securities, is referred to as securitization. See Steven L. Schwarcz, What Is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1996670.
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the repayment obligation of the SPE is not required to be dis10
closed as a liability on the balance sheet of the SPE’s creator.
This trend in the use of state SPEs is troubling. By reducing financial transparency, off-balance-sheet financing undermines financial integrity and creates a potential for abuse—
illustrated in the corporate context, for example, by Enron’s use
11
of SPEs for balance-sheet manipulation. Off-balance-sheet fi12
nancing can even trigger systemic consequences. Its use by
corporate SPEs is seen, for example, as a contributing cause of
13
the 2008 financial crisis. The lack of transparency can also
have other serious consequences, such as preventing state general obligation bonds from being priced correctly based on state
14
fiscal risk.
This Article examines state SPEs and their functions, comparing them to corporate SPEs. Although the use of state SPEs
15
is not inherently wrongful, they have a greater potential to be
10. See Schwarcz, Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, supra
note 9, at 1301, 1315 (describing the relationship between an SPE and its creator and explaining its “use[] to keep debt off a company’s balance sheet”).
11. Id. at 1309–12.
12. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (comparing systemic
risk resulting from corporate SPE and state SPE use); cf. Iman Anabtawi &
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1359 (2011) (observing that Enron’s use of SPEs could have triggered a systemic financial crisis if Enron’s
viability had more closely correlated with the viability of other financial institutions).
13. See, e.g., JOINT ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., THE U.S. HOUSING BUBBLE AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: VULNERABILITIES OF THE ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 5, 16–17 (2008), available at http://www.jec.senate
.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=b54b89ff-649e-4e45-93f0
-395d1f507762; MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34412, AVERTING
FINANCIAL CRISIS 2–5 (2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/103688.pdf; MARTIN NEIL BAILY ET AL., INITIATIVE ON BUS. &
PUB. POLICY AT BROOKINGS, THE ORIGINS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 27–29
(2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/
2008/11/origin%20crisis%20baily%20litan/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan; Niall
Ferguson, Wall Street Lays Another Egg, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2008, at 190, 198–
200; What Went Wrong, ECONOMIST (Mar. 19, 2008), http://www.economist
.com/node/10881318.
14. To the extent investors in state general obligation bonds are unaware
of de facto guaranteed state SPE debt (and of the fiscal impact of those de facto guarantees on the state), those bonds would almost certainly be mispriced.
15. See Schwarcz, Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, supra
note 9, at 1314 (beginning an inquiry into differentiating legitimate and illegitimate uses of corporate SPEs). In the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the
problem was not the use of corporate SPEs, per se. Rather, non-traditional asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligation (ABS CDO) securitization
transactions, which relied on corporate SPEs, were structured in a way that
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abused in public finance than in corporate finance. Several factors contribute to this aggravated potential. Reduced transparency of state SPEs, like corporate SPEs, can undermine financial integrity. Unlike corporate SPEs, however, reduced
transparency of state SPEs can also undermine constitutional
16
and democratic legitimacy. Moreover, state SPEs are more
likely to be misused than corporate SPEs because public finance is more susceptible than corporate finance to monitoring
17
failures.
even relatively small errors in cash flow projections could cause defaults and
downgradings. When these errors occurred, the resulting defaults and
downgradings panicked investors, who started avoiding the debt markets, in
turn causing the price of debt securities to fall, which in turn (because of
mark-to-market accounting) caused market prices to plummet further downward in a death spiral. The lack of debt financing meant that companies could
no longer grow—and in some cases, even survive—affecting the real economy
and, at least in part, contributing to the financial crisis. See The State of Securitization Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Secs., Ins., & Inv. of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 33–34 (2011) (statement of Steven L. Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law and Business,
Duke University School of Law) [hereinafter Testimony of Schwarcz], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg70772/pdf/CHRG-112shrg70772
.pdf; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from
the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376 (2008) (explaining the interrelated nature of securities such as ABS CDO transactions and
SPEs).
16. Cf. Carolyn Bourdeaux, A Question of Genesis: An Analysis of the Determinants of Public Authorities, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 441, 442
(2005) (observing that state SPEs are used to “escape [state] debt limitations
and possibly to circumvent tax and expenditure limitations”); Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 871, 900 (noting the “ability of public authorities to evade many
of the good governance checks applicable to public agencies such as oversight
and accountability” and proposing a unified regional overseer and setter of policy for public services provided by state SPEs).
17. Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 898–99 (noting that state SPEs lack key
regulatory features present in corporate SPEs—such as shareholders and
market forces—resulting in diminished oversight and increased potential for
abuse and corruption). This Article does not engage the question of federal
government use of SPEs, which is much more limited than state government
use of SPEs. For example, in order to stabilize and bring liquidity back to the
commercial paper markets during the 2008 financial crisis, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) created, among other facilities, the
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to operate as a lender of last resort for those markets. Because the Fed traditionally used its lender-of-lastresort powers under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to only make
loans to banks, it structured the CPFF as a series of Fed loans to State Street
Bank and Trust Company, which then made back-to-back loans to a newlycreated special-purpose entity, CPFF LLC. CPFF LLC used the back-to-back
loan proceeds to purchase commercial paper from corporations and other
commercial paper issuers. Tobias Adrian, et al., The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., May 2011, at 25,
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a taxonomy of state SPEs, explaining their distinguishing characteristics. Part II then examines the potential illegitimacies of state
SPEs, focusing on their use to remove transparency from public
financing. Part III analyzes how regulation should control these potential illegitimacies, arguing that any regulatory framework should embrace at least four overarching organizing principles: improving transparency of state SPE debt, improving
monitoring of state SPE debt, limiting state SPE debt, and improving state SPE governance. Part III also demonstrates how
18
a Model Public Authorities Oversight Law incorporating these
principles could be applied to improve state SPE governance
and public finance.
I. STATE SPE TAXONOMY
One must first understand state SPEs in order to analyze
them. Although there are “many conflicting definitions of what
19
[state SPEs] are,” the discussion below highlights their most
important characteristics. These characteristics include engaging in interstate government operations and running programs
as an integral part of state government. They also include, less
benignly, avoiding constitutional debt limits, avoiding federal
taxes, and reducing state financial transparency.
A. ENGAGING IN INTERSTATE FUNCTIONS
Some state SPEs are created by interstate agreement to
address governmental functions crossing state lines. Indeed,
one of the most well-known state SPEs is the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey, which operates “America’s busiest
airport system [JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark airports], marine
terminals and ports, the PATH rail transit system, six tunnels
and bridges between New York and New Jersey, the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan, and the World Trade Cen-

30–31. For a thoughtful introduction to the federal government’s use of SPEs,
see Cheryl D. Block, Congress and Accounting Scandals: Is the Pot Calling the
Kettle Black?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 365, 435–42 (2003). This Article also does not
directly engage the question of municipal government use of SPEs. But cf.
Model Pub. Auth. Oversight Law, infra app. I (embodying a regulatory framework that in principle could also be applied to SPEs established by municipalities or other government units).
18. See infra app. I (proposing a Model Public Authorities Oversight Law).
19. Howard Frant, Reconsidering the Determinants of Public Authority
Use, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 571, 575 (1997).
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20

ter.” State SPEs created by interstate agreement are general21
ly viewed with approval. Paradoxically, however, they are
22
“fairly unusual.”
B. RUNNING STATE PROGRAMS AS ENTERPRISES
Some state SPEs are created as “enterprises” to run state
23
programs as an integral part of state government. These types
of state SPEs typically finance their operations by issuing revenue bonds (also called revenue debt), repayable solely from the
24
profits of the enterprise. Investors in those bonds therefore
take the risk that the enterprise will be insufficiently profitable
to repay them. They have no legal recourse to the state’s general funds or tax revenues, and thus the bonds “are not consid25
ered state debt.” The state thereby allocates risks associated
with the enterprise to investors willing to take that risk, presumably for a higher interest rate on the bonds.
C. AVOIDING CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITS
State SPEs are sometimes created specifically to avoid
26
state constitutional debt limits. Most state constitutions, “as a
result of difficulties in one period or another, place some form
of restriction on the creation of legal debt, commonly the need
either for voter approval or passage of a constitutional amend27
ment.” States can avoid these debt limits (and the public ref20. See Overview of Facilities and Services, PORT AUTHORITY OF N.Y. &
N.J., http://www.panynj.gov/about/facilities-services.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2012).
21. Shestack, supra note 5, at 569 (observing that the “need for [state
SPEs] appears greatest on the bi-state or regional level as a means of handling
problems that cross jurisdictional lines”); cf. Frant, supra note 19, at 588 (discussing that it “seems plausible that authorities are used because they have
desirable organizational properties in certain situations,” as suggested by political-economy theories).
22. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, Partner and Chair of the
Public Finance Department, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (May 27,
2011).
23. Id. (referencing the California Department of Water Resources as an
example of a state enterprise SPE). State enterprise SPEs are sometimes also
justified on the basis that government “should mimic what a private market in
analogous goods would produce,” following the Tieboutian model of government-as-firm. Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860,
885 (2012).
24. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22.
25. Id.
26. See GASB STATEMENT NO. 14, supra note 8, ¶ 6.
27. COHEN, supra note 3, at 1.
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erendums needed to modify these limits) by issuing state SPE
28
debt.
D. FINANCING PRIVATE PROJECTS
State SPEs are also commonly created to facilitate the financing of private projects within a state through the issuance
29
of tax-exempt bonds. The state SPE, acting as a “conduit,” issues non-recourse bonds and then lends the bond proceeds to
the parties constructing the project; investors in the bonds have
30
recourse only to those parties and the project. Because a state
conduit SPE is an instrumentality of the state, interest paid to
investors on these bonds is exempt from federal taxation (under
the federal municipal bond exemption), even though the con31
duit SPE is not responsible for repaying those investors. This
elevates form over substance, enabling private parties to obtain
32
low-cost tax-exempt financing.
E. REDUCING STATE FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY
As discussed, state SPEs increasingly have been used in
recent years to reduce state financial transparency, generally
by engaging in off-balance-sheet financing much as corporate
33
SPEs have been used to reduce corporate transparency. Reduced transparency not only can mislead the public but also

28. Beverly S. Bunch, The Effect of Constitutional Debt Limits on State
Governments’ Use of Public Authorities, 68 PUB. CHOICE 57, 66 (1991) (concluding that the “results of this empirical analysis support the literature’s
claim that [at least one reason that] governments use public authorities [is] to
circumvent state constitutional debt limits”).
29. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22.
30. See id.
31. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006); Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis,
supra note 22.
32. See Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22 (observing that the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York is an example of a
state conduit SPE). Although an important purpose of corporate SPEs is to issue debt with higher credit ratings than the credit rating on corporate debt, it
would not appear that state SPEs could issue debt with higher credit ratings
than the credit rating on state general obligation (GO) debt. The higher credit
rating on debt issued by corporate SPEs reflects that the financial assets securitized by those SPEs “are usually more creditworthy, and almost always easier to understand and value, than the company itself.” Testimony of Schwarcz,
supra note 15. Public finance, however, is not as clearly asset based, and state
SPEs would lack the taxing power of states and, in contrast to states, could be
liquidated.
33. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.
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can enable government officials to avoid public scrutiny. In
New York State, for example,
[s]tatewide, politicians increasingly use [SPEs] as ATMs . . . withdrawing funds so that they can balance General Fund shortfalls . . . .
Initially, elected officials exercised some discipline and limited their
‘withdrawals’ to capital projects which would have a long, useful life,
but up front expense. More recently, however, withdrawals are being
34
used for [short-term purposes].

Off-balance-sheet financing is less tractable to solutions in public finance than in corporate finance because, as will be shown,
public finance is more susceptible than corporate finance to
35
monitoring failures.
The taxonomy has shown that state SPEs can have positive
utility, such as facilitating interstate arrangements and running state programs in ways that allocate associated risks to
36
investors willing to take those risks. But they also can have
potential illegitimacies.
II. POTENTIAL ILLEGITIMACIES
The taxonomy indicates at least three potentially illegitimate uses of state SPEs: to avoid state constitutional debt limits, to avoid taxes by obtaining form-over-substance federal tax
exemptions, and to reduce state financial transparency and en37
able government officials to avoid public scrutiny. Part II.A
addresses the first two illegitimate uses and Part II.B addresses the third.
34. E-mail from Scott Fein, Partner, Whiteman Osterman & Hanna LLP
and Dir., Pub. Auths. Project of the Gov't Law Ctr., Albany Law Sch., to author (Aug. 31, 2011) (on file with author).
35. See infra Part II.B.3.
36. State SPEs also have had historical benefits:
[N]otwithstanding the fiscal peril they may pose, [state SPEs] played
an important role underwriting the first meaningful urban infrastructure, helped fund the defense effort in both World Wars, and more recently, at least in [New York State], allowed [the State] to expand
housing and healthcare for the poor and elderly and implement environmental safeguards . . . . In the absence of [state SPEs] our State
(and Country) would be a different place.
E-mail from Scott Fein, supra note 34.
37. The allocation by states to enterprise SPEs and their investors of risks
associated with the enterprise is not illegitimate. To the contrary, the use of
SPEs to allocate risks more precisely between creators of SPEs and investors
in securities issued by the SPEs is widely recognized as economically desirable. See Testimony of Schwarcz, supra note 15; see also Nehemkis, supra note
5, at 14 (stating that where a state SPE “depends for economic survival upon
its own earnings rather than upon [state] legislative largess, a greater degree
of operating efficiency results”).
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A. CONSTITUTIONAL ILLEGITIMACY AND TAX AVOIDANCE
Although state SPEs are sometimes used to avoid constitutional debt limits in state constitutions, at least some of these
limits would not support the increased functions of modern
38
state government and hence are “obsolete.” Without the ability to get around these limits, many states “would barely be
39
able to function.” Although a more democratic way of addressing the limits would be to amend state constitutions to increase
40
or remove them, the longstanding use of state SPEs to bypass
obsolete debt limits is not this Article’s central concern.
Similarly, the use of state conduit SPEs to take advantage
of the federal municipal bond tax exemption is relatively
straightforward, at least from the standpoint of state public finance. The interesting question is why this federal tax exemption, unlike most other U.S. Internal Revenue Code exemp41
tions, respects form over substance. Answering that question,
however, would primarily be a federal tax law inquiry and thus
is beyond this Article’s scope.
B. REDUCING TRANSPARENCY AND AVOIDING PUBLIC SCRUTINY
The most troubling use of state SPEs is their increasing
use to reduce financial transparency and enable government
officials to avoid public scrutiny. Consider transparency. Rating
agencies and the public rely heavily on state financial state42
ments. The balance sheet—also called, in public finance, a
statement of net assets—is central because it shows the state’s
43
assets and liabilities.

38. Frant, supra note 19, at 574.
39. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22.
40. Frant, supra note 19, at 574.
41. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935) (holding that,
for federal tax purposes, a transaction’s substance is to be considered over its
form); see also IRC § 183: Activities Not Engaged in For Profit (ATG), IRS.GOV,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/IRC-%C2%
A7-183:--Activities-Not-Engaged-in-For-Profit-%28ATG%29 (last updated Aug.
3, 2012) (“The examiner needs to consider the substance of the facts.” (emphasis added)).
42. Cf. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., MOODY’S STATE RATING METHODOLOGY 11–12 (2004) (stating that “Moody’s relies heavily on audited GAAP [state]
financial statements”).
43. See GASB, STATEMENT NO. 14: BASIC FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND
MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS—FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ¶ 83 (1999).
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State SPE debt is often not shown, however, as balance44
sheet indebtedness of a state. On a purely technical level, this
makes sense: state SPEs are legally separate units of states,
45
and states rarely guarantee the debt of their units. States
therefore are not usually legally obligated to pay that debt. The
story, however, is more complicated.
Most state SPE debt is moral obligation debt, appropria46
tion-contingent debt, revenue debt, or non-recourse debt.
Moral obligation debt means that the state SPE debt is supported by a
reserve fund equal to maximum annual debt service; if the reserve
must be drawn down, certification shall be made to the governor (or
another appropriate official) who must include a request for the deficiency in the budget. The legislature is under no legal obligation to
47
fund the request, hence the moral appellation.

Appropriation-contingent debt (also called appropriation debt)
is different than moral obligation debt insofar as it contem48
plates the appropriation as the primary source of payment. It
is not technically a legal obligation of the state because the leg49
islature has no legal obligation to fund the appropriation.
Revenue debt is repayable solely from the profits of a state en50
terprise SPE, and thus legally is not state debt. And because
non-recourse debt is not a legal obligation of the state conduit
51
SPE that issues it, it is not a legal obligation of the state.
State SPE debt that a state is not legally obligated to pay
is not ordinarily shown as debt on the state’s balance-sheet. Occasionally, state SPE debt is shown in a separate column as in52
debtedness of the state’s “component units.” However, the relevant state accounting principles, promulgated by the
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), require
this disclosure only for debt of state SPEs that are both (i) “fiscally dependent” on the state—meaning that the state “either
44. See Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22.
45. Id.
46. Id. (observing that explicit state guarantees of state SPE debt are
“very rare”).
47. COHEN, supra note 3, at 5.
48. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22.
49. Id.
50. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., JOHN CHIANG, CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE, STATE OF
CALIFORNIA COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2010, at 28–29 (2011), available at http://www.sco.ca
.gov/Files-ARD/CAFR/cafr10web.pdf.
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has authority over the [state SPE’s] budget, the setting of its
53
taxes and charges, or its issuance of debt” —and also (ii) in a
non-temporary “financial benefit or burden relationship” with
54
the state. Thus, if a state is “only required to approve the issuance of revenue bonds for a water district but the water district does not receive a [non-temporary] subsidy” from the state,
the water district “would not be considered a component unit”
55
of the state. Although GASB accounting principles becoming
effective in 2012 could be broadly read to permit a state to report state SPE financing obligations—even absent any legal obligation by the state with respect to financing—such reporting
56
will not be mandated.
Accordingly, state SPE debt is rarely shown as debt on
state balance sheets and, even when shown (usually in a sepa57
rate column as indebtedness of the state’s component units),
may not be easily discernible. In 2006, for example, New York
State’s financial statements showed $48.5 billion of debt but
58
failed to show another $80 billion of state SPE debt.
This “off-balance-sheet” nature of state SPE debt can be
misleading, however, if the state ultimately backstops the SPE
debt. As discussed below, states often have strong economic and
reputational motivations to backstop the debt of their SPEs,
notwithstanding the absence of a legal obligation to do so.

53. GASB, GASB STATEMENT CONCLUDES REVIEW OF STANDARDS DEFINFINANCIAL REPORTING ENTITY 2 (2011), available at http://www.gasb
.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175822186077&blobheader=appli
cation%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2–3 (using the example of a water district of a county, and assuming that the water district does not itself “provide resources to the county”
other than indirectly by virtue of managing the county’s water resources).
56. For example, GASB provides discretion to a primary government to
include organizations that “do not meet the specific financial accountability
criteria” as component units if doing so would “prevent the reporting entity’s
financial statements from being misleading.” GASB, EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra
note 8, ¶ 39.
57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
58. See NYS Debt Facts, N.Y. ST. OFF. ST. COMPTROLLER, http://osc.state
.ny.us/debt/debtfacts.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2012); see also THOMAS P.
DINAPOLI, OFFICE OF STATE COMPTROLLER, STATE OF N.Y. COMPREHENSIVE
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 2010, at 187
(2010), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/finance/finreports/cafr10.pdf
(neglecting to separate out state SPE debt when identifying types of outstanding debt ratios).
ING THE
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1. De Facto “Guarantees”
A state will often have strong economic motivations to
backstop the debt of its SPEs. Except arguably in the case of
59
non-recourse debt of state conduit SPEs, a default on such
debt would signal uncertainty as to whether the state will pay
its debts generally, thereby jeopardizing the state’s credit rat60
ing. For example, in 1984 the State of Ohio stood behind its
water development authority’s revenue debt in order to reduce
61
rating-agency scrutiny of a technical default on that debt.
Markets and investors likewise believe that the economic compulsion to avoid increased borrowing costs resulting from a default on state SPE debt provides “enough incentive for the state
62
to pay” that debt to avoid an authority default. Some courts
have therefore ruled that (non-conduit) state SPE debt consti63
tutes debt of the state for constitutional purposes.
There are several other reasons why a state may decide to
support payment of its state SPE debt, even though the state is
not legally obligated to do so. Because state SPEs often operate
64
as an integral part of state government, the state may have
no practical choice but to support the SPE in order to support
the government services performed by the SPE—essentially a
“too-important-to-fail” variant of the corporate notion of too-big59. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22.
60. Cf. Moral Obligation Bonds, STANDARD & POOR’S (June 27, 2006,
12:26 AM), http://www.standardandpoors.com/prot/ratings/articles/en/us/?
articleType=HTML&assetID=1245334963892 (observing that if “a properly
structured moral obligation defaulted, despite clear original legislative support, the state’s willingness to pay on its other debt would need to be examined”).
61. E-mail from W. Bartley Hildreth, Professor of Pub. Mgmnt. & Policy,
Ga. State Univ. Andrew Young Sch. of Policy Studies, to author (Apr. 25, 2011)
(on file with author).
62. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22; see also Email from Scott Fein, supra note 34 (“Your observation about credit issues associated with default is in this State [New York] absolutely correct. Moral obligation bonds[] are, as you know, referred to on Wall Street as ‘feel good
bonds’ . . . they allow the State to feel good that it’s not really increasing the
State’s aggregate debt and Wall Street to feel good that moral obligation debt
is really GO debt in different clothing. Both know that although it may only be
a moral commitment . . . a default would, as you pointed out in your discussion
of the UDC [see infra note 75 and accompanying text], run the risk of curtailing the capital markets to the State.”).
63. Telephone Interview with Roger L. Davis, supra note 22 (observing
that “two or three states” have case law holding this, although “about onehalf ” of the states have case law holding to the contrary).
64. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing enterprise
SPEs).
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to-fail. In a federal context, for example, the government recently supported payment of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s
debt in order to promote stability and liquidity in the housing
65
markets. This not only constitutes a de facto guarantee but
also suggests that state SPEs considered by their managers to
be too important to fail might engage in morally hazardous behavior.
A state also may support payment of an SPE’s debt in order to honor a moral obligation. This is especially likely to occur
where the state SPE has issued moral-obligation debt. It also
could occur, however, where the state has issued appropriationcontingent debt since there “remains a potential moral obliga66
tion” to fund the appropriation.
Additionally, a state may support payment of an SPE’s
debt merely to protect the state’s reputation more generally. In
a corporate context, for example, at the outset of the 2008 financial crisis many banks backstopped their affiliated structured investment vehicles (SIVs) solely to protect the banks’
67
reputations. In the case of Citigroup, this occurred notwithstanding that it reduced the capital ratio that regulators monitor to gauge that bank’s ability to withstand losses on bad
68
loans and caused Moody’s to lower the bank’s long-term credit
69
rating. The reputational harm of not supporting payment of
an SPE’s debt may be even greater in a state than a corporate
context because “investor perception of an implicit . . . govern70
ment guarantee is hard to break,” even by “statutory dis-

65. Lorraine Woellert & John Gittelsohn, Fannie-Freddie Fix at $160 Billion with $1 Trillion Worst Case, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 13, 2010), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-13/fannie-freddie-fix-expands-to-160-billion
-with-worst-case-at-1-trillion.html.
66. See E-mail from W. Bartley Hildreth, supra note 61 (stating that even
with appropriation-contingent debt there “remains a potential moral obligation,” and observing that a moral-obligation argument was used “against the
Governor’s hesitancy to get involved with the bond rating analysts’ questions”
about whether the state would support a state SPE’s debt).
67. Shannon D. Harrington & Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup to Consolidate
Seven SIVs on Balance Sheet (Update3), BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 13, 2007),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=aT0Ix2iDnZRk (reporting that Citigroup Inc. did this in the amount of $49 billion, following similar decisions by HSBC Holdings PLC and WestLB AG to backstop their SIVs).
68. Id.
69. Id. (reporting a lowering from Aa2 to Aa3).
70. Block, supra note 17, at 437 (referencing investor perception of an implicit U.S. government backing of Fannie Mae’s debt).

2012]

STATE SPECIAL-PURPOSE ENTITIES

383

claimers and [prospectus] disclosures” that the SPE debt is not
71
backed by the government.
For all of these reasons—to avoid jeopardizing its credit
rating, to support government services performed by an SPE, to
honor its moral obligations, and to generally protect its reputation—a state may well backstop the debt of its SPEs notwithstanding the absence of a legal obligation to do so. State financial statements that do not transparently disclose that debt and
the state’s de facto guarantee thereof would be misleading. As
discussed, however, states rarely make that disclosure in their
72
financial statements.
2. Consequences of Lack of Transparency
The lack of transparency can undermine public finance and
also make it even more likely that states will continue to manage their financial affairs with insufficient regard to their abil73
ity to repay debts. That ability is not unlimited, even under a
state’s taxing power. At some point, an increase in the tax rate
will cease to raise tax revenues because taxpayers will lose the
incentive to earn income, engage in more tax planning to reduce their effective tax rate, or move to other states, causing
economic output (and tax revenues) of the troubled state to de74
cline further. The state ultimately may have to cut back on
essential services; and creditors—even those whose debt claims
are backed by the state’s full faith and credit—may suffer losses if the state, unable to raise sufficient tax revenues to repay
its obligations, is forced to restructure its debts.
Lack of transparency can also create financial contagion
due to investor difficulty in distinguishing among types of state
debt. For example, as a result of the 1975 default by a New
71. Id. (referencing statutory disclaimers and prospectus disclosures that
Fannie Mae’s debt is not backed by the U.S. government). In 1963, for example, the City of Chicago paid eighty percent of the back interest on bonds issued by the Calumet Skyway Authority due to a “feeling that a bond default
by the Authority might damage the city’s overall bond rating.” MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 97 (citations omitted).
72. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
73. Cf. State and Municipal Debt: The Coming Crisis?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs., & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the
H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of
Rep. Patrick McHenry, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform) (observing that the “vast majority of states now find themselves in a fiscal
straightjacket”).
74. Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59
UCLA L. REV. 322, 327 (2011) [hereinafter Schwarcz, State Bankruptcy].
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York State SPE (the Urban Development Corporation) on its
75
moral obligation bonds, financial markets shut off financing
76
for all New York State bonds. Federal backing was ultimately
77
required to allow the state to return to the bond markets.
Additionally, lack of transparency can mislead not only investors but also citizens as to real costs. In a prominent example, a state SPE (the Washington Public Power Supply System,
commonly known as WPPSS) issued revenue bonds in order to
78
finance the construction of two power plants. The revenue
bonds were secured by contracts with local utility districts to
79
80
purchase the resulting electricity. Unknown to residents, the
utility districts agreed to support payment of the bonds even if
81
the plants were never completed. Due to cost overruns, the
82
plants were not, in fact, completed, leaving the utility districts—and thus residents of those districts—as the deep pock83
ets for payment.
Finally, lack of transparency can impose an unforeseen
burden on out-of-state taxpayers. This could occur, for example,
if the federal government, as a result of increasingly negative
75. The UDC, tasked with building low cost housing throughout the state,
was given authority to issue $2 billion worth of bonds backed by the moral obligation of the state. But, due largely to inept management, the authority was
unable to repay its debt. DONALD AXELROD, SHADOW GOVERNMENT 74 (1992).
76. Id. at 72–80. The contagion effect may have been exacerbated by New
York City’s concurrent financial crisis. Id.
77. Id. at 81.
78. Id. at 66–69.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 67, 101.
81. Id. at 67 (observing that the local utility districts were required to
service WPPSS bonds regardless of whether the plants became operational). It
is unclear why the utility districts did not disclose their effective guarantees of
the WPPSS bonds. The likely reason is that accounting principles do not always require disclosure of contingent guarantees. See FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD. (FASB), STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
NO. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES ¶¶ 2–3, 8 (1975). These paragraphs
were not affected by subsequent proposed amendments. FASB, EXPOSURE
DRAFT, DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN LOSS CONTINGENCIES 16–20 (2008). Axelrod
asserts the lack of disclosure was a result of WPPSS not being answerable to
any of the democratic institutions in the state. AXELROD, supra note 75, at
101. But that does not explain why the utility districts did not themselves
make the disclosure.
82. AXELROD, supra note 75, at 67.
83. The utility districts, at the behest of residents, then sued WPPSS to
challenge the legality of the contracts and prevent being forced to pay for
plants that were never completed. Id. at 69. A politicized Supreme Court of
Washington sided with the utility districts and voided the contracts. Id. Without revenue to support the bonds, WPPSS defaulted. Id.
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is called on to bail out a state’s SPE

3. Comparing State and Corporate SPE Lack of Transparency
The analysis above has shown that the use of state SPEs
can reduce a state’s financial transparency, with egregious consequences for the state, its residents, its creditors, and potentially the federal government (and thus taxpayers throughout
the country). The Article next compares those consequences
with the consequences of the lack of transparency caused by
corporate SPEs.
A lack of transparency caused by corporate SPE debt can
lead to companies unexpectedly failing and can also have sys86
temic consequences to the financial system. For these reasons,
Congress and the SEC have devoted significant attention to an
87
appropriate regulatory framework.
The lack of transparency caused by state SPE debt can
similarly lead, as discussed, to unexpected state financial prob88
lems. That lack of transparency might also have systemic consequences; by undermining governmental financial integrity, it
89
could infect government securities markets. Although it would
appear that systemic consequences could be greater in a corporate than a state context because markets for corporate debt
84. Many states are believed to be at or near crisis levels of debt. See, e.g.,
Mary Williams Walsh, State Debt Woes Grow Too Big to Camouflage, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/
business/economy/30states.html?pagewanted=1. Several of these states, such
as New York and California, are also some of the heaviest issuers of SPE debt.
The recession is expected to only continue to negatively impact state’s fiscal
conditions. See PHIL OLIFF ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
STATES CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT 1 (2012), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf.
85. Many believe that the most heavily indebted states will require a
bailout or a type of assisted bankruptcy from the federal government. See, e.g.,
Mary Williams Walsh, A Path Is Sought for States to Escape Debt Burdens,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
01/21/business/economy/21bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all. Unforeseen state
SPE debt would need to be addressed if, for example, the state relies on the
indebted SPEs for essential services.
86. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
87. See infra Part III.B.
88. See supra notes 73–85 and accompanying text.
89. Compare Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008)
(examining systemic consequences of corporate financial failures), with
Schwarcz, State Bankruptcy, supra note 74 (examining systemic consequences
of state financial failures).
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90

are larger than markets for state debt, any comparison of consequences must be qualified by the possibility of correlations
between those markets. A loss of confidence in, or a collapse of,
government securities markets could trigger a broader lack of
confidence or collapse of debt markets, possibly affecting the
markets for corporate debt securities. A somewhat parallel
event occurred in 2008 when a collapse of the mortgage-backed
securities market triggered the broader collapse of virtually all
91
markets for debt securities. Similarly, the current European
Union sovereign debt crisis is believed to have the potential to
92
trigger broader systemic consequences.
Therefore, as with corporate SPE debt, attention should be
given to creating an appropriate regulatory framework for
problems of state SPE debt. Indeed, the need for such a regulatory framework may even be greater in the state than the corporate context. States may have a greater inherent propensity
than corporations to want to use SPEs to raise off-balancesheet debt. Because states, unlike corporations, cannot “fail” in
the sense of being forced to liquidate, they lack that deterrent
93
against non-transparent use of SPEs.
Furthermore, state public finance is more susceptible than
corporate finance to monitoring failures. States are monitored
90. In the second quarter of 2011, there was reportedly $7.8 trillion of
corporate debt outstanding in the United States, versus only $2.9 trillion of
state and municipal debt. Outstanding U.S. Bond Market Debt, SIFMA.ORG
(June 8, 2012), http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/
StatisticsFiles/CM-US-Bond-Market-Outstanding-SIFMA.xls.
91. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 1359–61.
92. See, e.g., How to Save the Euro, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2011, at 11,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21529049 (“As credit lines gum up
and outsiders plead for action, it is not just the euro that is at risk, but the future of the European Union and the health of the world economy. . . . A Greek
default would threaten many banks, not just in Greece: this week the markets
took aim at French banks that hold southern European debt.”). Corporate
counterparty risk, on the other hand, is more likely to have a systemic impact
than governmental counterparty risk because corporate viability is more likely
to be closely correlated than governmental viability since governments cannot
be liquidated. Cf. supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between systemic risk and the correlation of financial viability).
93. Cf. Block, supra note 17, at 369–70 (observing that the risk of bankruptcy provides at least a “modest[] check on corporate accounting gimmicks,”
but lacking bankruptcy, “temptations for the government to engage in creative
accounting may be even greater than those in the private sector”). Even
though states cannot be liquidated, they still will have significant incentives to
avoid default. It is unclear, though, whether those incentives are as strong as
the incentive to avoid liquidation, and thus whether they are as likely to encourage sound financial choices.
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94

by residents and creditors. Corporations, in contrast, are mon95
itored by shareholders and creditors. Creditors monitor only
to the limited extent of their negotiated covenants, and covenants in state debt are even more limited than covenants in
96
corporate debt. Therefore creditor monitoring of state SPE
debt is likely to be even more limited than creditor monitoring
of corporate SPE debt.
States are also monitored by residents, who have even less
incentive to monitor than most creditors. Unlike creditors, few
if any state residents are likely to have sufficient amounts at
97
stake to justify the cost of monitoring. The ability of state residents to freely choose to move to another state, notwithstanding some cost in doing so, may well further reduce their incen98
tive to monitor. Furthermore, residents who wish to monitor
state SPE debt may find themselves unable to correct problems
revealed by the monitoring. For example, after voters in New
York State rejected a $500 million bond issue in November
94. See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 872–74 (noting that while corporations are accountable to shareholders and creditors, public authorities do
not have shareholders, and the public has no shareholder enforcement mechanisms).
95. Id. at 872–73 (“[C]orporations are scrutinized and evaluated by numerous groups such as investors, government entities and shareholders.”).
96. Id. at 878 (discussing the oversight that corporate shareholders and
creditors have over the actions of corporations, but there is no group that has
“taken on the shareholder[] role” in the context of public authorities). Covenants in state debt may be more limited than covenants in corporate debt because states, unlike corporations, have taxing power and cannot be liquidated.
Recently there has been discussion of adding covenants to state debt securities
in an effort to exert fiscal discipline. See, e.g., Ted Phillips, Control by Covenant, BOND BUYER, Mar. 18, 2010, at 1, 6, available at http://www.bondbuyer
.com/issues/119_301/new_york_state_budget-1009673-1.html?zkPrintable=
true (reporting plan of New York Lieutenant Governor Richard Ravitch to include “an event of default if the review board found the budget out of balance,
and neither the Legislature nor the governor took steps to return it to balance”); Yvette Shields, Experts Weigh in on Fixing Illinois, BOND BUYER, June
30, 2011, at 1, 8, available at http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/119_373/
illinois_budget-1014194 -1.html?zkPrintable=true.
97. See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 5, 881–82 (“[T]he public has significantly less voting power, enforcement rights and political power than private
shareholder investors in private corporations . . . . In many ways, avoiding
public participation is the reason public authorities are created.”).
98. The WPPSS debacle also shows that residents may not even become
aware of problems until too late. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying
text (observing that residents of local utility districts were not informed that
those districts had effectively guaranteed payment of WPPSS bonds). The residents only became aware of the problem after electricity costs rose to pay for
the cost of those bonds. AXELROD, supra note 75, at 69 (discussing a “consumer
revolt” after electricity rates increased greatly).
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1981, the State directed one of its SPEs, the Urban Develop99
ment Corporation, to issue the bonds. A citizens’ lawsuit to
stop that bond issuance was dismissed by a court as lacking
standing because the New York State Constitution gave voters
the right to approve only the issuance of bonds issued by the
100
“[s]tate.”
In contrast, corporations are monitored by shareholders in
addition to creditors. Shareholders can have concentrated holdings, and they face few if any legal obstacles to monitoring and
101
enforcement. Moreover, shareholders have a greater incentive than creditors to monitor because shareholders are residu102
al claimants who would lose money before creditors.
In short, creditor monitoring of states and corporations is
limited. Shareholder monitoring helps fill that shortfall for corporations, but resident monitoring is unlikely to fill that shortfall for states. The resulting monitoring insufficiency may make
it even more likely that states (as compared to corporations)
103
will use SPEs to hide debt.
4. Undermining Democratic Control of State Functions
Although not the primary focus of this Article, it should be
noted that another significant difference between state SPEs
and corporate SPEs is the potential for state SPEs to undermine governmental legitimacy. State SPEs are usually “governed by an appointed board with policymaking and budgetary
104
independence from the state . . . that created them.”
One
commentator describes these entities as creating “a hidden
99. AXELROD, supra note 75, at 122.
100. Id. at 122–23.
101. See Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate
Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 69
(2010–2011) (“In sum, shareholder activism itself, changing market conditions, and regulatory changes have ushered in a new shareholder-oriented
world for public corporations in which more investors are able and willing to
take a greater role in shaping corporate decision-making . . . .” (emphasis added)).
102. Id. at 102.
103. Cf. Scott Fein, Would a State Constitutional Amendment Promote Public Authority Fiscal Reform?, 12 N.Y. ST. B.A. GOV’T, L. & POL’Y J. 52, 53
(2010) (observing that New York State has, in the past, increased issuance of
state-supported SPE debt in an effort to avoid the public referenda required
for issuance of state debt).
104. Bourdeaux, supra note 16, at 442. State SPEs usually have the “right
to sue and be sued, own property, and may have the ability to tax and invoke
eminent domain.” Id.
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government that is not highly accountable through regular
105
democratic processes.”
Others say these entities “function
106
outside the normal framework of government.”
This Article has already discussed how state SPEs are used
to circumvent state constitutional debt limits. More broadly,
however, state SPEs have been considered a means by which
the corporate management structure (and its believed efficiency) could be applied to public-sector management, thereby
107
avoiding political constraints and bureaucratic red tape.
State SPEs are thus not always subject to the types of controls
applicable to managers of traditional state government agen108
cies.
For example, competitive bidding procedures—which
traditionally are used to diminish favoritism and political corruption in governmental contracting—are not necessarily ap109
plicable to state SPEs. At least one commentator argues that,
except for multi-jurisdictional state SPEs, the “benefits” accruing from this supposed corporate efficiency are largely illuso110
ry.
The Article next considers how regulation could help to
mitigate state SPE abuses, focusing on the problem of state
SPE debt.
III. TOWARDS REGULATORY SOLUTIONS
Although state SPEs raise many concerns, including concerns over their use to reduce state financial transparency,
they do have legitimate uses. Therefore, rather than banning
state SPEs outright, regulatory solutions should seek to address the concerns. This Part begins that inquiry by examining
recent state SPE reform efforts. It then compares those efforts
with recent reforms of corporate SPEs. Thereafter, the Article
105. Id. at 441 (emphasis added); see also Bunch, supra note 28, at 57 (observing, at that time, that “[m]uch of the literature on public authorities indicates that governments use authorities to circumvent debt limits”).
106. Robert G. Smith, The Web of Actors in Authority Policy Implementation, 18 POL’Y STUD. J. 986, 986 (1990).
107. Shestack, supra note 5, at 555.
108. For example, responding to the failure of the Massachusetts Housing
and Finance Authority and to certain other Massachusetts SPE failures, State
Senator Patricia McGovern explained, “[w]hile each authority may have been
justified on its own merits, the combined effect of these efforts has been to
place the state in a precarious situation where many of its critical functions
are performed by autonomous, non-elected governmental units.” AXELROD, supra note 75, at 103 (quoting Senator Patricia McGovern).
109. Shestack, supra note 5, at 565.
110. See id. at 569.
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develops a broader conceptual framework for regulating state
SPEs.
A. RECENT STATE SPE REFORM EFFORTS
New York State has attempted in recent years to reform its
state SPEs. Beginning in 2000, it passed a series of three
111
112
laws to “[r]ein[] in New York’s [s]ecret [g]overnment.” The
Debt Reform Act of 2000 established statutory limits for the
amount and terms of state SPE debt that New York is contrac113
tually or constitutionally obligated to pay. These limits, however, do not address moral obligation debt or debt for which
114
New York is contingently obligated.
In 2005, New York passed the Public Authorities Account115
ability Act, which imposed heightened state SPE reporting
116
requirements and stricter governance rules. And in 2009,
117
New York enacted the Public Authorities Reform Act, establishing the Authorities Budget Office to review and analyze
118
state SPEs.

111. Wilson & Eichelberger, supra note 1, at 18–21.
112. OFFICE OF BUDGET & POLICY ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, PUBLIC AUTHORITY REFORM: REINING IN NEW YORK’S SECRET GOVERNMENT (2004), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/feb04/
publicauthorityreform.pdf.
113. Wilson & Eichelberger, supra note 1, at 18; see also N.Y. STATE FIN.
LAW §§ 67-a, 67-b (McKinney 2011).
114. “State-supported debt” is defined as
any bonds or notes, including bonds or notes issued to fund reserve
funds and costs of issuance, issued by the state or a state public corporation for which the state is constitutionally obligated to pay debt
service or is contractually obligated to pay debt service subject to an
appropriation, except where the state has a contingent contractual obligation.
§ 67-a. Furthermore, neither obligations due in less than one year nor those
pursuant to annual legislative appropriations are considered “debt” subject to
New York state’s constitutional requirement for public referenda. 87 N.Y. JUR.
2D PUB. SEC. § 10 (2011) (citing § 67-b(1)(a); Local Gov’t Assistance Corp. v.
Sales Tax Asset Receivable Corp., 2 N.Y.3d 524 (2004)).
115. 2005 N.Y. Laws ch. 766.
116. Wilson & Eichelberger, supra note 1, at 19–20.
117. 2009 N.Y. Laws ch. 506. The legislative findings in section 1 of the
Public Authorities Reform Act stated that, even after enactment of the Public
Authorities Accountability Act of 2005, “fundamental problems of transparency, accountability, the responsibilities and functions of board members and
oversight have not been addressed, leading to a lack of public trust in these
institutions.” Id. § 1.
118. Wilson & Eichelberger, supra note 1, at 20–21.
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These reforms have already started bearing fruit. For example, the New York State Comptroller has reported that, “[a]s
a result of audit findings and recommendations, and administrative and legislative actions,” a number of New York’s state
119
SPEs had announced actions to improve their accountability.
The Comptroller also more recently observed that several state
SPEs had restructured their bonds after seeking the Comptroller’s approval, resulting “in total debt service savings of $456.9
million on a cash flow basis and $175.9 million on a net present
120
value basis over the life of the bonds.” The Comptroller has
121
also released reports on the operations of specific state SPEs.
B. RECENT CORPORATE SPE REFORM EFFORTS
Regulatory efforts to reform the use of corporate SPEs began, in response to Enron’s collapse, with promulgation by
122
Congress of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and the issuance
by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission of a
2005 report on off-balance-sheet corporate transactions (SEC
123
Staff Report).
These regulatory efforts then continued,
124
spurred by the 2008 financial crisis, with the Dodd-Frank Act
125
and the government-agency rulemaking thereunder.
119. OFFICE OF BUDGET & POLICY ANALYSIS, OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN NEW YORK STATE: ACCELERATING MOMENTUM TO ACHIEVE REFORM 38–39 (2005), available at http://www.osc.state.ny

.us/reports/pubauth/pubauthoritiesreform.pdf.
120. THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, PUBLIC
AUTHORITY DEBT STRUCTURE AND NEW YORK’S FUTURE GENERATIONS 1
(2010), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pubauth/reports/pa-debt-struct
-092710.pdf.
121. See New York’s Public Authorities, OFF. ST. COMPTROLLER,
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pubauth/reports.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2012) (including reports on the New York State Urban Development Corporation, the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and the New York State Thruway Authority).
122. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
123. STAFF OF THE SEC, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 401(C) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS
WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND
TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/soxoffbalancerpt.pdf [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT]. The SEC
Staff Report was informally issued by the SEC staff without formal approval
by the SEC’s Commissioners; it thus was not an official report of the SEC.
124. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
125. Much of the substance of the Dodd-Frank Act will be realized through
administrative rulemaking by the SEC and other federal government agencies. Cf. Lois L. Weinroth & Richard L. Fried, Securitization Provisions of the
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act indirectly addressed improving
accounting standards that govern when corporate SPEs should
126
be consolidated with their parent companies. The SEC Staff
Report, however, more directly focused on the use of corporate
127
SPEs to reduce financial transparency. Observing that “many
of the areas dealing with off-balance sheet arrangements involve significant use of accounting-motivated structured trans128
actions” that utilize corporate SPEs, the SEC staff advocated
against “transactions and transaction structures primarily motivated by accounting and reporting concerns, rather than eco129
nomics.” In that connection, the SEC staff urged the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, the corporate
equivalent of the GASB) to consider changing corporate accounting principles in order to increase the transparency of
corporate SPE debt and also admonished participants in the financial reporting process to become more aware of the prob130
lem. To that end, FASB revoked its Financial Accounting
Standard No. 140, which governed off-balance-sheet treatment
of certain corporate SPE debt, and replaced it with a more nu131
anced (although also more ambiguous) test.
The Dodd-Frank Act did not address the use of corporate
SPEs per se, instead focusing on their use in securitization
132
transactions. These are transactions in which corporate SPEs
Dodd-Frank Act, 16 J. STRUCTURED FIN., Fall 2010, at 38, 43 (“[I]t is impossible to predict at this time the full range of regulations that will be applicable
to the asset-backed securitization industry.”).
126. See Neal Newman, Enron and the Special Purpose Entities—Use or
Abuse?—The Real Problem—The Real Focus, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 97,
122–23 (2007).
127. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 123, at 3 (identifying a variety of
“initiatives to improve transparency . . . in the financial reporting process”).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 166:
ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AN AMENDMENT OF FASB
STATEMENT NO. 140 (2009), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?
blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175823288480&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&
blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
132. Steven L. Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Bus., Duke
Univ. Sch. of Law, The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture at the SEC Historical Society: Protecting Investors in Securitization Transactions: Does
Dodd-Frank Help, or Hurt? (Mar. 28, 2011) (transcript available at http://
c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/programs/sechistorical032811-transcript.pdf; audio available at http://www.sechistorical.org/
collection/programs/sechistorical-032811-podcast.mp3) [hereinafter Schwarcz,
2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture].
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issue securities to investors and use the proceeds to purchase
financial assets, collections on which are used to repay the se133
curities. In that context, Dodd-Frank addressed, essentially,
three issues: (1) improving disclosure to investors in the securities about the nature of the underlying financial assets; (2) limiting conflicts of interest between originators of those financial
assets and investors in securities issued by corporate SPEs
purchasing those assets; and (3) increasing rating agency scru134
tiny of securitization transactions. The first two issues have
little application per se to state SPEs, which have not been
used (and there is no indication they are likely to be used) for
135
securitization transactions. Nonetheless, the broader goals of
Dodd-Frank to improve investor disclosure, to limit conflicts of
interest, and to increase rating agency scrutiny have some resonance for state SPEs.
C. A BROADER CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM
These regulatory efforts to reform state and corporate
SPEs suggest four overarching organizing principles: improving
transparency of state SPE debt; improving monitoring of state
SPEs; limiting state SPE debt; and improving state SPE governance. In deriving a broader conceptual framework, this Article first compares whether these principles would address all of
136
the types of negative consequences identified in this Article.
Those consequences can be summarized as follows:
(i) The off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt (i.e., that
debt is often not shown as a liability on the balance sheets of
their sponsoring states) can undermine state financial integrity, making it more likely, for example, that states will continue
to manage their financial affairs with insufficient regard to
their ability to repay their debts. This can lead to unexpected
state financial problems, especially if the state ultimately backstops the SPE debt (and states often have strong economic and
reputational motivations to de facto guarantee that debt, notwithstanding the absence of a legal obligation to do so).
133. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
134. Schwarcz, 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture, supra note 132.
135. It is not even certain that Dodd-Frank’s reforms make sense in the
securitization context. See id. If state SPEs were to begin to engage in securitization transactions, regulators could then consider the extent to which DoddFrank’s reforms, or possible other reforms, should apply.
136. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 59
(2003) (arguing that legal reasoning may not exist as an independent concept,
and that what really matters is consequences).
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(ii) The off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt might
also have systemic consequences by causing a loss of confidence
in state and possibly other government securities markets.
(iii) The off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt can
mislead not only investors—including by creating contagion
due to investor difficulty in distinguishing among types of state
debt—but also state citizens as to real costs. Furthermore, a
federal government bailout of that debt can impose an unforeseen burden on out-of-state taxpayers.
(iv) These consequences can be worse in public finance
than in corporate finance because the use of SPEs in public finance is more susceptible to monitoring failures than their use
in corporate finance.
(v) The non-representative corporate-style governance of
state SPEs can undermine constitutional and democratic legitimacy. It can also generate conflicts that cause a state SPE to
incur debt for its own benefit and not necessarily for the state’s
137
benefit.
Thus, the negative consequences identified in this Article
result from the off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt,
monitoring failures relating thereto, and state SPE governance
failures.
These consequences correlate well to the overarching organizing principles suggested by regulatory efforts to reform
state and corporate SPEs. The principle of improving transparency of state SPE debt would address consequences from the
off-balance-sheet nature of state SPE debt; the principle of improving monitoring of state SPE debt would address consequences of monitoring failures; the principle of limiting state
SPEs debt could address all those consequences; and the principle of improving state SPE governance would address consequences of governance failures.
This Article’s conceptual framework for regulatory reform
therefore adopts these four overarching organizing principles:
improving transparency of state SPE debt; improving monitoring of state SPE debt; limiting state SPE debt; and improving
state SPE governance. To apply these principles to actual regulatory reform, I have incorporated the principles into a Model

137. This is not dissimilar to the agency-cost concerns addressed in
Schwarcz, Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, supra note 9, and
in Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457 (2009).
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Public Authorities Oversight Law (Model Oversight Law),
proposed for enactment by individual states. I next examine
how these principles, as articulated in the Model Oversight
Law, could be applied.
Before doing so, however, it is worth asking why a state
would consider enacting the Model Oversight Law or similar
legislation, which would limit the state’s ability to continue issuing non-transparent debt through SPEs. One answer is that
the state would be increasing its financial transparency, as
139
New York State has been trying to do. New York has even
found that improving the transparency of its SPE debt can, at
140
least in certain cases, save money. Another answer is that as
the problem of state SPE debt becomes more publicly known,
states that don’t engage in reform will face reputational
141
costs. These costs might even include increased financing
costs as investors become wary of the non-transparent financial
condition of reform-averse states. And public and media outcry
about the problem might put pressure on GASB to engage in its
own effort to further reform government accounting principles
for state SPE debt, which would remove the initiative from the
142
states. Finally, if all else fails, the federal government could
consider making state SPE reform a condition of any federal
143
government bailout of a state. So long as the state ultimately
chooses whether to enact the reform, that should not impose an
144
unconstitutional encroachment on state sovereignty.
D. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK
This Part considers each principle in turn, examining how
the Model Oversight Law incorporates the principle and how
145
that Law would apply to state SPEs. To that end, this Part
138. See infra. app. I.
139. See supra notes 112–21 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
141. See supra Part II.B.1.
142. FASB has been trying to do that for corporate accounting principles
governing SPE debt. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 85 (observing that “[m]any believe that the most heavily indebted states will require a bailout or a type of assisted bankruptcy from
the federal government”).
144. See Schwarcz, State Bankruptcy, supra note 74, at 336 (explaining
why, so long as a “state has the right to decide whether or not to [enact a federally proposed legal framework], its sovereignty would not be impugned”).
(footnote omitted)).
145. All references to specific sections in the remainder of the Article refer
to the Model Oversight Law in Appendix I.
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examines how the Model Oversight Law incorporates, and
would apply to state SPEs, the principles of improving transparency, improving monitoring, limiting debt, and improving
governance.
1. Improving Transparency of State SPE Debt
The Model Oversight Law seeks to improve transparency
in two ways. The customary way of making debt transparent is
by requiring balance-sheet disclosure under accounting rules.
In the United States, accounting rules are promulgated by—
pursuant to private ordering in the form of delegation of authority by the Securities and Exchange Commission to—FASB
146
in the case of corporate accounting and GASB in the case of
147
government accounting.
The Model Oversight Law first attempts to improve transparency by improving balance-sheet disclosure of state SPE
debt. Section III.1(b) of that Law requires each state SPE to
maintain audited financial statements, certified by independent public accountants as complying with GASB’s generally accepted government accounting principles. It also requires each
state SPE to deliver copies of these financial statements to the
Authorities Oversight Office, an independent state government
office created by the Model Oversight Law to oversee state
SPEs. Subsection III.1(e) of that Law further requires each
state SPE to establish a semi-independent audit committee to
provide direct oversight of the accountants’ audits.
The Model Oversight Law does not purport to question the
government accounting principles promulgated by GASB. This
Article suggests, however, that GASB should further examine
how its accounting principles should treat balance-sheet disclosure of state SPE debt. One important question, already discussed in this Article, is how to determine when such debt
148
should be disclosed in the first instance. A second question is
how state SPE debt, otherwise required to be disclosed, should
be disclosed—for example, as a liability on the state SPE’s balance sheet, in a separate column of the balance sheet as indebtedness of the state’s component units, or merely as a con-

146. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text; see also Steven L.
Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 320 (2002) (discussing this
delegation of authority).
147. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
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tingent liability shown in the notes to the balance sheet. Be150
cause few people actually read financial statement notes,
FASB has been struggling with a similar question in the con151
text of corporate accounting for SPE debt.
The Model Oversight Law’s second approach to improving
the transparency of state SPE debt is to consider mechanisms
that go beyond accounting for such debt to be publicly disclosed.
To this end, section II.1(e) of that Law requires the Authorities
Oversight Office to assist state SPEs in improving the procedures by which their finances are publicly disclosed, including
standardizing disclosure of their liabilities. Standardized disclosure would help to facilitate comparative analysis. Section
II.1(i) also requires the Authorities Oversight Office to periodically issue reports on its findings and analyses and, except to
the extent proprietary, to make these reports and analyses publicly available.
2. Improving Monitoring of State SPE Debt
Improved monitoring is a strong focus of the Model Oversight Law, which creates the Authorities Oversight Office to act
as the primary monitor. Section III.1(c) of the Model Oversight
Law requires each state SPE to inform the Authorities Oversight Office of its outstanding debt securities, the credit ratings
on such debt, and any changes in those credit ratings. This enables the Authorities Oversight Office not only to monitor that
debt but also to publicly promulgate information about the debt
(thereby also increasing transparency).
Section II.1(h) of the Model Oversight Law requires the
Authorities Oversight Office to monitor any defaults on state
SPE debt and to find out how the defaults are resolved. Section
III.1(d) of that Law ties back into that provision by requiring
each state SPE itself to inform the Authorities Oversight Office
of defaults on its debt and their resolution. By studying how de149. A superficially simple solution would be to mandate balance-sheet disclosure of all state SPE debt, but that might have unintended consequences,
such as undermining disclosure by making it too complex. Cf. Steven L.
Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (showing that excessive disclosure can undermine its
comprehensibility).
150. See Annual CFO Survey, ASS'N GOV'T ACCOUNTANTS (July 2008),
http://www.agacgfm.org/AGA/Documents/Research/cfosurvey2008-1-.pdf (surveying CFOs and financial executives about the usefulness of financial statements).
151. See supra note 131.
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faults are resolved, the Authorities Oversight Office should be
able to ascertain the extent to which the state itself, directly or
indirectly, is supporting its SPEs. The Authorities Oversight
Office would also be able to make this information publicly
available.
The Model Oversight Law further adopts a parallel track to
ascertain the extent to which the state itself is supporting its
SPEs. Section II.2(b) of that Law authorizes the Authorities
Oversight Office to obtain, from any state government source,
information and documentation revealing the existence and the
nature of any direct or indirect guarantees backed by the
state’s full faith and credit of state SPE debt. Section III.1(c) of
that Law ties back into that authorization by requiring each
state SPE itself to inform the Authorities Oversight Office of
these guarantees.
Finally, section III.1(g) of the Model Oversight Law contemplates improved state SPE monitoring of its own debt. To
this end, that Law requires each state SPE to establish a semiindependent finance committee to review and make recommendations on proposals by the SPE to issue debt.
3. Limiting State SPE Debt
To some extent, the finance committee requirement discussed above should help limit state SPE debt at appropriate
levels. Section II.1(g) of the Model Oversight Law additionally
requires the Authorities Oversight Office to make recommendations to the state’s governor (and, as appropriate, the legislature) on setting state SPE debt limitations. To avoid the problem of these limits becoming obsolete over time, as has occurred
at the state level with constitutional restrictions on bond
152
debt, section II.1(g) also requires the Authorities Oversight
Office to update its recommendations over time.
The extent to which state SPE debt should be limited will
depend on various factors, including the extent to which such
debt—and the extent to which state backstopping of such
debt—can be transparently disclosed. The less transparent the
disclosure, the more such debt should be limited. This suggests
a potential conflict of interest: a state that is intent on nontransparently backstopping its SPE debt might not want to follow recommendations of the Authorities Oversight Office. In
152. See generally supra notes 26–28, 38–40 and accompanying text (discussing those constitutional restrictions).
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the event of such a conflict, the only recourse of the Authorities
Oversight Office may be to go public with its recommendations—an event that would require significant political will.
4. Improving State SPE Governance
The Model Oversight Law adopts several approaches to
improving state SPE governance. These approaches seek to
strengthen the accountability of state SPEs to state government and, by extension, to the public, while also providing
mechanisms for enforcement similar to those provided to corporate shareholders by Sarbanes-Oxley and to bondholders
through corporate bond covenants.
On a general level, section III.2(a) of the Model Oversight
Law requires each state SPE to inform the Authorities Oversight Office of its governance structure. Subsections (c), (d), and
(f) of section II.1 of that Law also require that Office to review
and analyze the operations, practices, and reports of state
SPEs, to assist state SPEs in improving their management
practices, and to recommend to the state’s governor (and, as
appropriate, the legislature) how to improve state SPE performance. Subsections (c) and (d) of section III.2 require each state
SPE to submit to the Authorities Oversight Office a multi-year
financial plan as well as a mission statement setting forth the
SPE’s purposes and goals, a description of its stakeholders (and
the SPE’s understanding of their expectations), and a selfevaluation.
Section III.1(f) of the Model Oversight Law additionally
requires each state SPE to self-examine its governance by establishing a semi-independent governance committee. This
governance committee has the duty to review corporate governance trends, to keep the state SPE’s management informed of
current best governance practices, to review and recommend
any necessary or appropriate updates to the SPE’s governance,
and to advise on the qualifications of the SPE’s management.
The Model Oversight Law further attempts to limit conflicts of interest between state SPEs and their managers. To
this end, section III.2(a) of that Law requires each state SPE to
inform the Authorities Oversight Office of its conflict-ofinterest rules. Section III.1(f) of that Law also enables the governance committee to examine and advise on conflict-of-interest
issues. Additionally, section III.2(b) requires each state SPE to
report to the Authorities Oversight Office the compensation
and other benefits of each member of management whose com-
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bined compensation and benefits exceeds a threshold level.
High compensation levels may well signal the potential for con153
flict.
Finally, section II.2 of the Model Oversight Law imposes
penalties on state SPEs and their managers that fail to comply
with that Law’s requirements. The Authorities Oversight Office
has the power to publicly warn and censure state SPEs for noncompliance and to investigate complaints and issue any needed
subpoenas. It also may request the state’s governor (and, as
appropriate, the legislature) to suspend or dismiss members of
state SPE management for cause.
CONCLUSION
Like corporate special-purpose entities, or SPEs, which
154
dominate the so-called “shadow banking” system, states increasingly are using SPEs to create a vast shadow-financing
155
network invisible to the public. The result is to reduce the
transparency of public finance and to enable government officials to avoid public scrutiny.
For example, because state SPE debt is not technically a
legal obligation of the state, states do not have to disclose that
156
debt in their financial statements. This lack of disclosure can
nonetheless be misleading; states often have compelling economic and reputational motivations to, and almost always do,
stand behind that debt.
The resulting lack of transparency undermines the ability
of the public to monitor state fiscal obligations, thereby misleading investors and citizens as to the state’s real costs and increasing the risk of systemic financial contagion. Ominously,
the growing political pressure for debt reduction at the federal
157
government level is likely to exacerbate these effects by push153. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
154. See generally ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FRBNY STAFF REPORT NO. 458:
SHADOW BANKING 4 –5 (2010) (examining the economics of shadow banking);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, Inaugural Address at the
Boston University Review of Banking & Financial Law Inaugural Symposium
(Feb. 24, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1993185 (defining the
shadow banking system).
155. Cf. AXELROD, supra note 75, at 13–15 (characterizing state SPEs as a
form of “shadow” government).
156. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., THE NAT’L COMM’N OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM,
THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 6–7 (2010); Michael Sekora, How to Reduce the National Debt Without Raising Taxes or Cutting Spending, ECONOMY IN CRISIS
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ing even more of a financing burden onto states, in turn increasing their incentives to issue debt through SPEs.
The impact of this lack of transparency on public finance
may well turn out to be worse than the impact of corporate SPE
lack of transparency on corporate finance. Because states, unlike corporations, cannot fail in the sense of being forced to liquidate, they lack that deterrent against non-transparent use of
SPEs. State public finance is also more susceptible than corporate finance to monitoring failures. Creditor monitoring of
states and corporations is limited; shareholder monitoring
helps fill that shortfall for corporations, but resident monitoring is unlikely to fill that shortfall for states. Moreover, being
an integral part of government, state SPEs that lack transparency can undermine not only the integrity of public finance but
also constitutional and democratic legitimacy.
A regulatory framework to govern the use of state SPEs is
thus critically needed. This Article shows that any such framework should embrace at least four overarching organizing principles: improving transparency of state SPE debt, improving
monitoring of state SPE debt, limiting state SPE debt, and improving state SPE governance. Using these principles, the Article proposes a Model Public Authorities Oversight Law and examines how it should apply to state SPEs and public finance,
thereby enabling states to utilize the financing benefits of SPEs
while controlling their hazards.

(Jan. 22, 2011), http://economyincrisis.org/content/how-reduce-national-debtwithout-raising-taxes-or-cutting-spending; Stabilize the Debt, THE COMMITTEE
FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET, http://crfb.org/stabilizethedebt/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2012).
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APPENDIX I
MODEL PUBLIC AUTHORITIES OVERSIGHT LAW

158

AUTHORITIES OVERSIGHT OFFICE
1. The Authorities Oversight Office is hereby established
159
as an independent entity within the [Department of State].
2. The Authorities Oversight Office shall perform the duties and exercise the powers set forth in this Public Authorities
Oversight Law [hereinafter, Oversight Law].
3. The Authorities Oversight Office shall be governed by a
Director, appointed by the Governor upon the advice and consent of the [Legislature]. The Director shall hold office for a
term of [____] years, subject to removal for cause by the Governor [upon the advice and consent of the Legislature]. The Director’s compensation shall be established by the Governor.
4. The Director may appoint such officers, employees, and
other agents and fix their compensation as the Director deems
appropriate [subject to applicable civil service and other appropriate constraints, including State funding limitations and advice and consent of the Governor].
I.

II. DUTIES AND POWERS OF THE AUTHORITIES OVERSIGHT OFFICE

1. The Authorities Oversight Office shall have the duty to
(a) develop a definition of State public authorities that are
subject to this Oversight Law [hereinafter Authorities];
(b) develop and maintain a comprehensive list of Authorities and their functions;
(c) conduct reviews and analyses of the operations, practices, and reports of Authorities;
(d) assist Authorities in improving their management practices;
158. This Model Public Authorities Oversight Law, which is based in part
on portions of New York State’s Public Authorities Reform Act of 2009, 2009
N.Y. Laws ch. 506 is intended solely as a skeletal framework of regulation that
could address the article’s four overarching organizing principles—improving
transparency, improving monitoring, limiting debt, and improving governance.
Like the article, the Model Oversight Law is focused on state SPEs. In principle, however, it could also be applied to SPEs established by municipalities or
other non-state government units.
159. The Model Public Authorities Oversight Law does not purport to address how the Authorities Oversight Office would be funded.
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(e) assist Authorities in improving the procedures by which
their activities and finances are publicly disclosed, including
standardizing the content and format of their annual reports
and standardizing disclosure of their liabilities;
(f) make recommendations to the Governor [and the Legislature] about improving the performance, reporting, organization, and oversight of Authorities;
(g) make recommendations to the Governor [and the Legislature] on setting debt limitations for Authorities and on updating these limitations as appropriate;
(h) monitor all defaults and all events [hereinafter incipient defaults] that with notice or lapse of time or both would become defaults on debt issued by Authorities, and follow through
to understand how such defaults and incipient defaults are resolved;
(i) no later than [date] and annually thereafter, issue reports on its findings and analyses to the Governor [and the Legislature] and, promptly thereafter (except to the extent of any
information or analysis therein that is proprietary), make such
reports and analyses publicly available; and
(j) provide such other information and analyses as may be
reasonably requested by the Governor [or the Legislature].
2. The Authorities Oversight Office shall have the power to
(a) request and receive from any Authority such information, books, records, financial statements, other documentation, and assistance as may be necessary or appropriate to perform the Authorities Oversight Office’s duties;
(b) request and receive from the State or any State agency
or entity such information, documentation, and assistance as
may be necessary or appropriate to ascertain the existence and
nature of any direct or indirect guarantees of, or other assurances of payment on, debt issued by Authorities, to the extent
such guarantees or other assurances are directly or indirectly
backed by the full faith and credit of the State;
(c) enter into cooperative agreements with other government offices to efficiently carry out its work and not duplicate
resources;
(d) investigate and act upon complaints or recommendations regarding any Authority, and issue subpoenas pertaining
to such investigations;
(e) establish and publish guidelines, and have the power
based on such published guidelines, to publicly warn and censure Authorities for non-compliance with this Oversight Law;
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(f) request the Governor [and, as needed, the Legislature]
to suspend or dismiss members of management of Authorities
for cause;
(g) promulgate regulations to effectuate the purposes of
this Oversight Law; and
(h) do anything else necessary or appropriate to effectuate
any of the foregoing.
III. DUTIES OF AUTHORITIES
1. Each Authority shall have the duty to
(a) cooperate with the Authorities Oversight Office as contemplated by this Oversight Law, including (without limiting
the other obligations listed below) providing such information,
books, records, other documentation, and assistance as requested in accordance therewith;
(b) maintain audited financial statements, certified by independent public accountants as complying with generally accepted government accounting principles, and deliver copies of
such audited financial statements to the Authorities Oversight
Office;
(c) inform the Authorities Oversight Office of all outstanding debt securities, including (i) the ratings by credit rating
agencies on such debt securities and, promptly after it occurs,
any change in such ratings, and (ii) any direct or indirect guarantees of, or other assurances of payment on, such debt securities, to the extent such guarantees or other assurances are directly or indirectly backed by the full faith and credit of the
State;
(d) inform the Authorities Oversight Office of all defaults
and incipient defaults on its debt and of how such defaults and
incipient defaults are resolved;
(e) establish an audit committee, with at least [____] independent members [who shall constitute a majority of the audit
committee, and] who shall possess the necessary skills to understand the duties and functions of the audit committee; the
audit committee shall recommend to the Authority’s management the hiring of an independent public accounting firm, shall
set the compensation to be paid to such firm, and shall provide
direct oversight of the performance of the audits performed by
such firm;
(f) establish a governance committee, with at least [____]
independent members [who shall constitute a majority of the
governance committee, and] who shall possess the necessary
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skills to understand the duties and functions of the governance
committee; the governance committee shall keep the Authority’s management informed of current best governance practices, shall review corporate governance trends, shall review and
recommend any necessary or appropriate updates to the Authority’s governance, shall advise on the skills and experiences
required of members of the Authority’s management, and shall
examine and advise on ethics and conflict-of-interest issues;
and
(g) if and when the Authority issues debt or has debt outstanding, establish a finance committee, with at least [____] independent members [who shall constitute a majority of the finance committee, and] who shall possess the necessary skills to
understand the duties and functions of the finance committee;
the finance committee shall review and make recommendations
on proposals for the issuance of debt by the Authority.
2. No later than [date] and annually thereafter, each Authority shall also have the duty to provide to the Authorities
Oversight Office
(a) a description of the Authority, its activities undertaken
during the past year, its governance structure, its code of ethics, its conflict-of-interest rules, and (from time to time promptly after it occurs) any change to any of the foregoing;
(b) a listing of the compensation and other benefits, direct
and indirect, of each officer, director, other member of management, employee, and agent of the Authority making compensation and benefits aggregating in excess of $[________];
(c) a mission statement setting forth the purposes and
goals of the Authority, a description of the Authority’s stakeholders and the Authority’s understanding of their expectations, a set of criteria by which performance of the Authority
and achievement of its goals may be evaluated, and a selfevaluation based on those criteria; and
(d) a [____]-year financial plan, including a current and
projected capital budget and an operating budget report.
3. Notwithstanding sections III.1 and III.2 above, the Authorities Oversight Office may, upon application of any Authority, waive any requirement listed in those sections upon a
showing that the Authority meets the criteria for such a waiver. Such criteria shall be established by regulations issued by
the Authorities Oversight Office with the advice and consent of
the Governor [and the Legislature], taking into account (among
other factors) the relevance of the requirement to evaluation of
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the Authority’s effective operation and the burden such requirement places on the Authority. Each waiver so granted
shall be disclosed in the applicable report of the Authorities
Oversight Office issued pursuant to section II.1(i) of this Oversight Law.

